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This is the first case in which this Court has been required to 
determine whether a legislative provision passed by Congress may be 
contrary to the Constitution, and therefore void. The challenge is 
raised by Venancio Suldan, a former national government police officer. 
The provision questioned is part of the National Public Service System 
Act relating to dismissal of government employees for disciplinary 
reasons. 
Specifically, Mr. Suldan contends that the last two sentences of 52 
F~ Code § 1561 are unconstitutional because those sentences permit a 
management official to make the final determination on a question of 
dismissal without reviewing, and perhaps even without receiving, the 
evidence introduced at the te~ination hearing prescribed in the Act. 
hi additional constitutional claim ;s that the language of 52 FSM Code § 
156 permits a biased official to ~ke the final decision. 
Procedural Background 
This case is before the Court for the second time. During the 
first proceeding, the same constitutional arguments were raised. Since 
no decision had yet been made by the highest management official, this 
Court held that consideration of the constitutional issues would be 
premature. The case was remanded to President Nakayama for his 
1§156. Recommendations. The committee sball prepare a full 
written statement of its findings of fact and its recommendations for 
action within seven calendar days after the close of the hearing. Its 
recommendations may include modification or reversal of the disciplinary 
action, from which appeal was taken. It shall forthwith transmit that 
statement, with such supporting documentation as it deems appropriates 
to the hi,hest management official responsible for the agency in Wb1c 
the a el ant is or was 10 ed. The decision of that mana ement 
(emp as s a e 
-74-
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
341 
SULDAN v. FSM (II) 
Cite as 1 FSM Intrm. 339 (Pon. 1983) 
decision. Suldan v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 201 (Pon. 1982). 
On November 5, 1982, President Nakayama, after "complete and 
careful revieW' of the record, ruled that Mr. Suldan had on several 
occasions failed to carry out his police duties properly and that those 0 
failures constituted sufficient grounds for termination. 2 He concluded 
that the good of the public service would be served by dismissal. 
President Nakayama specifically disagreed with a legal inter-
pretation of the ad hoc commdttee which had presided over Mr. Suldan's 
termination hearing. See 52 FSM COde §§ 153-155. That commdttee, 
noting Mr. Suldan's personnel files reflected sick leave and annual 
leave credit for absences relied upon by the government as grounds for 
termination, had concluded that the absences had in effect been 
forgiven. The committee reasoaed that although Mr. Suldan's unexplained 
absences did constitute sufficieft cause for his termination, the 
government had waived its right to rely upon those absences as grounds 
for dismissal. 
President Nakayama concluded that the granting of annual and 
sick leave to Mr. Suldan had no such effect. He therefore denied 
Mr. Suldan's request for reinstatement. 
Appealing to this Court, Mr. Suldan admits that his acts and 
omissions could have justified his termination. He does not deny that 
Zrbe decision of the ad hoc committee, November 3, 1981, states as 
established facts that Mr. Suldan failed to report to work on four 
occasions, three of those times without properly notifying his 
superiors. On one of the occasions a fight occurred in the presence of 
a high governmental official whom Mr. Suldan was supposed to protect. 
The ad hoc committee also found that on a fifth occasion Mr. Suldan 
deserted his post and used a government vehicle for an unauthorized 
purpose. 
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President Nakayama carefully reviewed the record of the termination 
hearing. Instead, he relies on the claim that the statute is 
unconstitutional on its face in that it would permit a decision by the 
"highest management official" either without full review of the hearing 
record or based upon information outside of the record. 
His claim concerning impartiality differs only slightly. In 
addition to arguing that the statute unconstitutionally fails to require 
that the decision maker be impartial, he also contends that President 
Nakayama may have been unfairly biased against him and that the 
President's decision therefore was unfair. 
I. JUDICIAL REVIE.W OF LEGISIATION 
Mr. Suldan asks that this Court declare part of one section, 52 FSM 
Code § 156, of the National PUblic Service System Act unconstitutional. 
~ .. 
It has not previously been determined whether the Court has authority to 
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. Therefore, before going to 
the merits of Mr. Suldan's attack on the statutory language it is 
necessary first to determine whether this Court has the powers of 
judicial review which Mr. Suldan assumes. 
Analysis of constitutional grants of power of course must start 
with the constitutional language itself. Alaphonso v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 
209, 214 (App. 1982); FSM v. Tipen, 1 FSM Intrm. 79, 82 (Pon. 1982). 
The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia contains no 
direct statement about judicial review, yet various provisions bear upon 
the question and provide guidance. 
The Constitution's Supremacy Clause declares unequivocally that 
attempted governmental action in conflict with the Constitution is 
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invalid. "This Constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of the 
people and is the supreme law of the Federated States of Micronesia. k1 
act of the Government in conflict with this Constitution is invalid to 
the extent of conflict." FSM Const. art. II, § 1. 
Obligations are imposed by the Constitution upon the national and 
state governments. 3 Public officials must take an oath to uphold and 
support the Constitution. 4 Thus, the Constitution allocates powers 
between state and national governments and among the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of the national government but 
exercise of those powers must be in accordance with the Constitution 
itself. 
Although all public officials are duty bound to avoid 
unconstitutional action, the Consti~ution unmistakably places upon the 
~': 
judicial branch ultimate responsibility for interpretation of the 
Constitution. The judicial power of the national govemment is vested 
in the Supreme Court, art. XI, § 1, and this Court is given original and 
appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under or requiring 
interpretation of the Constitution. Id. art. XI, §§ 6(b), 7. 
Certification to this Court's appellate division is required of state or 
local courts in cases involving substantial questions requiring 
interpretation of the Constitution. Id. art. XI, § 8. Finally, the 
~'It is the solemn obligation of the national and state governments 
to uphold the provisions of this Constitution and to advance the 
principles of tmity upon which this Constitution is. founded." FSM 
Canst. art. XIII, § 3. 
~'On assuming office, all public officials shall take an oath to 
uphold. praoote, and support the laws and the Constitution a~ prescribed 
by statute." FSM Canst. art. XIII, § 7. 
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Constitution establishes this as "the highest court in the nation,"and 
requires that our decisions be consistent with the Constitution. MI. 
art. XI, §§ 2, 11. 
These Constitutional provisions leave no doubt that all persons 
purporting to exercise governmental powers available through goveLuwents 
established under this COnstitution are bound to act in accordance with 
the provisions of the Constitution. Officials t whether they be in the 
legislative, executive, or judicial branch, may not rely upon the 
Constitution for their powers while s~ltaneously disregarding the 
limits of those powers as provided in the Constitution. 
While all public officials are sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
the Constitution places upon the courts the ultimate responsibility for 
interpreting the Constitution.· We. are forswom by the Supremacy Clause 
:i. ~ 
from enforcing national laws or treaties contrary to the Constitution 
itself. In a case such as this, where a party before the Court insists 
that a particular national law contains provisions contrary to the 
Constitution, we are required by the Constitution to consider that 
assertion. If we determine that the statutory provision is indeed 
repugnant to the Constitution, we may not enforce the statutory 
provision nor permit its enforcement by others. Such a statute, in the 
words of the Supremacy Clause, would be "invalid to the extent of the 
conflict." 
While the words of the Constitution independently establish this 
Court's responsibility to review statutes enacted by Congress and other 
actions of officials governed by the Constitution and to refrain ~ 
enforcing or supporting any law or action which we find to be violative 
of the Constitution, it may be worthwhile to verify that other sources 
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or modes of analysis lead to the same conclusion. 
This Court has noted previously that comparison of this 
Constitution to that of the United States, as well as review of the 
journals of the Micronesian Constitutional Convention, reveal that this 
Constitution is based in great part upon the Constitution of the United 
States. See Lonno v. Trust Territory, 1 FSM Intrm. 53, 69 (Kos. 1982). 
These similarities of approach mandate that this Court, in attempting to 
determine its role under this Constitution, will give serious 
consideration to United States constitutional analysis at the time of 
the Micronesian Constitutional Convention. Tosie v. Tosie, 1 FSM Intrm. 
149, 153-54 (Kos. 1982). 
The two Constitutions. reflect. substantial similarity of approach 
concerning judicial review. Neith_er contains the words "judicial 
review." Yet both provide for s~~aration of powers anxmg executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches, and the division of powers among the 
national and state governments. The judiciary provisions in the two 
Constitutions are similar5 and both Constitutions contain Supremacy 
Clauses. 6 See In re Jonas, 1 FSM Intrm. 322, 327 (App. 1983). 
5Compare art. XI of the Federated States of Micronesia Constitution 
with art. III of the United States Constitution. See also the 
comparison set forth in In re Nahnsen, 1 FSM Intrm. 97, 102 (1982). 
6The FSM Constitution provides a considerably stronger statement of 
constitutional supremacy, naming only the Constitution as "supreme law." 
The United States Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2, identifies "Laws of the 
United States" and "Treaties made ••• under the Authority of the United 
States" as also being the "supreme Law of the Land." It was a court 
decision which determined that the United States Constitution was 
paramount over other United States laws. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Thus the FSM Constitution, with its 
direct mandate of constitutional supremacy over other national law, is, 
even more strongly suggestive of judicial review. 
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Turning to the American constitutional law on the' subject of 
judicial review, we immediately confront one of the most famous and 
renowned of all United States court decisions, Marbury v. Madison, 5 
u.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). The United States Supreme Court 
there held that the Constitution required the judiciary to refrain from 
enforcing laws enacted by the United States Congress contrary to the 
Constitution. 
The decision is now among the most frequently quoted of all 
judicial analyses and is generally regarded as a powerful and persuasive 
statement of the need for judicial review. The case merits some 
extended discussion here. 
Marbury and others asked the United States Supreme Court to issue a 
writ of mandamus to require Secreta~ of' State James Madison to deliver 
judicial c~ssions signed by outgoing President John Adams but still 
undelivered when President Adams' term of office expired. The new 
president, Thomas Jefferson, had ordered Secretary of State Madison not 
to deliver the judicial c~ssions. 
The question was whether the Court had power to issue the writ of 
mandamus asked for by the petitioners. The petitioners relied upon the 
Judiciary Act of lrag9 which Chief Justice Marshall interpreted as indeed 
attempting to give the United States Supreme Court original jurisdictio~ 
to issue writs of mandamus. He saw the grant of power as inconsistent 
with the Constitution which gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction 
only in limited kinds of cases. 
Faced with an apparent conflict between the law enacted by the 
United States Congress and the Constitution itself, Chief Justice 
Marshall found it necessary to determine whether the Court nevertheless 
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should uphold and enforce the law enacted by Congress. He began his 
analysis by considering the nature of constitutions in general. 
"Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate 
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and 
consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act 
of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 u.s. (1 Cranch) at 177, 2 L.Ed. at 73. Marshall saw this 
"fundamental principle" as one "essentially attached to a written 
constitution". He then noted that it is "emphatically the province and 
duty" of the judiciary to "say what the law is." 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must 
of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If 
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must 
decide on the operation of each. 
So if a law be in Appcsition to the 
constitution; if both the law and the constitution 
apply to a particular case, so that the court must 
either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the 
constitution disregarding the law; the court must 
determine which of these conflicting rules governs 
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial 
duty. 
Id. at 177-78. 
The principles led inexorably to his conclusion: "If, then the 
courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior 
to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution and not such 
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply" Chief 
Justice Marshall felt that a contrary conclusion would "subvert the very 
foundation of all written constitutions." Id. at 178. 
More than 1'25 years have elapsed but Marbury v. Madison remains 
binding law in the United States today. The decision has stood the test 
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of time both pra~tically, in that it has worked effectively in the 
United States, and as a persuasive and unrefuted analysis. 7 
These considerations alone would be compelling reasons for this 
Court to follow the Marbury approach even if our options were 
unrestricted. However the Court by no means has unfettered freedom in 
interpreting the Constitution. If the words of the Constitution are 
ambiguous or doubtful, it is our duty to seek out the intention of the 
framers. FSM v. Tipen, 1 FSM Intrm. 79, 83 (Pon. 1982). The 
Constitution was drafted against the background of the United States 
Constitution, and the pattern of provisions in the Federated States of 
Micronesia Constitution touching upon the notion of judicial review is 
similar to the United States Constitution's provision. By 1975, when 
the M[cronesian Constitutional Convention was being held, judicial 
review was at the very heart of fhe American constitutional system. By 
using the United States Constitution as a blueprint, the drafters 
created a presumption that they were adopting such a fundamental 
American constitutional principle as judicial review, found to be 
inherent in the language and very idea of the United States 
Const~tution. There is no indication in the constitutional history of a 
desire to reject judicial review. The Constitutional Convention's 
70ne commentator, in noting that Chief Justice Marshall's analysis 
is not entirely conclusive, nevertheless recognizes that "[n]o one has 
formulated a stronger textual argument for the proposition that 
congressional interpretation is final, or for any other alternative." L. 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 22 (1978). See also J. Nowak, R. 
Rotunda, & J. Young, Constitutional Law 10 (1978) ("Although Marshall's 
decision can be divided and attacked, it stands as an impressive 
argument when taken as a whole. The Chief Justice, in this case, is 
only asserting that the Constitution is a superior form of law 
established by the direct will of society in which the Judges must 
follow in the course of deciding issues before them.") 
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acceptance of the pertinent provisions of the United States 
Constitution's provisions, coupled with silence on the question of 
judicial review, amounts to a powerful statement of the assumption of 
judicial review. 
I note that in assuming the concept of judicial review of 
legislative action, the framers of the Constitution did not work a 
radical change from previous legal practice in M[cronesia under the 
Trust Territory Government. 8 Nor does acceptance of the concept set the 
Federated States of M[cronesia on a distinctly American path which may 
seem strange or alien to other nations throughout the world. Although 
the concept of judicial review had essentially American origins9 and is 
often seen as a product of the common law,10 many countries whose legal 
systems are traceable to civil law or other legal traditions now also 
8 Even without a constitution to enforce, the Trust Territory High 
Court set various statutes aside on grounds that they violated rights of 
due process or equal protection. See,~, Trust Territory v. 
Bermudes, 7 TTR 80 (~s. 1974); Trust Territory v. Tarkong, 5 TTR 252 
(Yap 1970); Yang v. Yang, 5 TTR 427 (Pon. 1971). 
9In addition to Marbury v. Madison, supra, see A. Hamilton, The 
Federalist No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). (liBya 
limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified 
exception to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it 
shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. 
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than 
through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to 
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution 
void.") 
10 The 1610 statement of Lord Coke, a famous English jurist, is 
often pointed to as the original articulation of the concept of judicial 
review: '~en an Act of Parliament is against common right and 
reason ••• the common law will control it and adjudge such act to be 
void." R. Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court 23 (1969), quoting from 
Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rept. 647, 652 (1610). 
-83-
) 
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
350 
SULDAN v. FSM (II) 
Cite as 1 FSM Intrm. 339 (Pon. 1983) 
db h ·· 1 f· d· · 1 . 11 a ere to t e pr1nc1p e 0 JU 1C1a rev1ew. 
A brief summary. The constitutional language demonstrates that 
judicial review is necessary to implement the scheme of the 
Constitution. This Constitution is based upon the United States 
Constitution, which in tum has at its very foundation the idea of 
judicial review. Finally, the concept of judicial review is not unique 
to those nations who trace their jurisprudence to the American system or 
to the common law. Rather the concept is familiar throughout the world 
and is widely thought to be inherent in a constitutional system. For 
all of these reasons I conclude that this Court has the constitutional 
power and obligation to review legislative enacbments of Congress and to 
set aside any national statutes to the extent they violat~ the 
Constitution. 
II. CONsTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Having determined that the Court has the requisite authority and 
responsibility to respond to an assertion by a citizen that a statute 
enacted by Congress is unconstitutional, consideration now must proceed 
to ~he standards to be employed in determining whether a statute 
violates the Constitution. 
11 "In the European heartland of the civil-law orbit, the most 
elaborate systems of judicial review are found in Austria, Italy and 
West Germany •••• In the socialist orbit, we encounter judicial review 
in Yugoslavia." R. Schlesinger, Comparative Law 322 n.103 (1980); See 
also D. Clark, Judicial Protection of the Constitution In Latin America, 
2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 405 (1975) ("Out of a total Latin American 
population of 286 mdllion, a majority of people live in countries'with 
relatively effective judicial review. ") i Mezey, Civil Law and Comnon 
Law Traditions: Judicial Review and Legislative Supremacy in West 
Germany and Canada,32 IntI. and Camp. L.Q. 689 (1983); and B. Okere, 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy Under 
the Nigerian Constitution, ide at 214, 223-28. 
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Mr. Suldan contends that the last two sentences of 52 FSM Code 
§ 156 violate his constitutional right to continued government 
employment. The Constitution says nothing directly about a right to 
continued employment. Mr. Su1dan relies on the Due Process Clause in 
the Constitution's Declaration of Rights. 12 This Court has not 
previously outlined or determined the extent of constitutional 
protection available here to a national government employee threatened 
with termination of his job. The jouma1s of the Micronesian 
Constitutional Convention are silent on the question. We must therefore 
look elsewhere for guidance. In A1aphonso v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 209 
(App. 1982), our appellate division traced the origins of the Due 
Process Clause and located the United States Constitution as its source. 
Decisions of United States court~.interpreting the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment of the Unit~d States Constitution, especially 
decisions rendered prior to completion of the Constitutional Convention, 
were identified as primary sources of guidance for this Court in 
deducing the meaning of our Due Process Clause. !s!. at 216; ~ also In 
re Iriarte (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 239, 249 (Pon. 1983). 
A. Government Employment as Property 
American constitutional law at the time of the Micronesian 
Constitutional Convention yields th~ following pertinent principles, 
which I find to have been adopted in the Federated States of Micronesia 
Constitution. Government employment that is "property" within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause cannot be taken without due process. 
12 "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, or be denied the equal protection of the 
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To be property protected under the Constitution, the employment right 
must be supported by more than merely the employee's own personal hope. 
There must be a claim of entitlement based upon governmental assurance 
of continual employment or dismissal for only specified reasons. These 
assurances may come from various sources, such as statute, formal 
contract, or actions of a supervisory person with authority to establish 
terms of employment. Only if an employment arrangement meets this 
property test does the Federated States of Micronesia Constitution 
require procedural due process as a condition to its termination. 13 See· 
generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 495-96 
(1978). 
The parties are in apparent agreement that Mr. Suldan's continued 
employment with the nationar g~ernment is sufficiently protected by 
~~ 
statute to constitute property. They plainly are correct. The National 
Pub lic Service System Act does not permit termination on the whim of a 
supervisor. k1 employee may be dismissed only "for disciplinary 
reasons" and upon the determination of a management official that "the 
good of the public service will be served thereby." 52 FSM Code 
§ 152.14 
"[W]ritten notice setting forth the specific reasons for the 
dismissal" is required, as a condition for dismissal. Id. References 
to "disciplinary reasons," ,"written notice of ••• specific reasons for the 
13Since~. Su1dan's employment interests are held to be 
"property," there is no necessity for determining whether his "liberty" 
interests under the Constitution also may be implicated. 
14The Act's provisions concerning reductions-in-force, 52 FSM Code 
§ 147, and probationary service, 52 FSM Code § 138, are not here 
applicable. _ 86-
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dismissal," hearing rights and "good of the public service" combine to 
evoke a congressional requirement that "wrongful conduct" or "cause" 
be established as a grounds for dismissal under §§ 151 to 157. The Act, 
then, fixes owo conditions for termination of an employee under 52 FSM 
Code §§ 151-157. Responsible officials must be persuaded that: 
(1) there is "cause", that is, the employee has acted wrongfully, 
justifying disciplinary action; and (2) the proposed action will serve 
the "good of the public service.,,15 
Congress has also secured this interest in continued employment 
with a right to procedural protections. In addition to the written 
notice requirement, there is a right to a hearing before an ad hoc 
committee of three members. Id. at §§ 154-155. The recoumendation of 
that committee goes to the "highest management official responsible for 
the agency in which the appe1lan{ is or was employed," for final 
decision. These statutory provisions create a mutual expectation of 
continued employment for national government employees and protect thgt 
employment right by limiting the permissible grounds, and specifying 
necessary procedures, for termination.16 This, in turn, is sufficient 
15See 52 FSM Code § 152. See also FSM Pub. Serve Reg. 18.4: "An 
adverse action may not be taken against an employee covered by this part 
except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the public 
service." 
16petitioner here does not contend that the terms of the Act are so 
vague as to leave the decision makers without 'adequate standards to 
determine whether grounds for termination exist. Some generality seems 
to be an inescapable hazard of any effort to define grounds for termi-
nation. "It is not feasible or necessary for the Government to spell 
out in detail all that conduct which will result in retaliation. The 
most conscientious of codes that define prohibited conduct of employees 
includes 'catch-all' clauses prohibiting employee 'misconduct', 
'inmora1ity', or 'conduct unbecoming. '" Arnette v. Kennedy, 416 u.s. 
134, 161, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1648, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974), quoting with 
approval from Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
J 
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protection of the employment right to establish a property interest. 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 u.s. 564, 576-78, 92 
S.Ct. 2701, 2708-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 
B. Constitutional Due Process 
Recognizing that Mr. Suldan's interest in continued employment is 
sufficiently structured to constitute property and qualify for due 
process protection, we proceed to the next tier of inquiry. 'Ibis 
requires a determination of what process is due under the Constitution. 
The procedures identified as an irreducible minimum under the 
Constitution must then be compared to those available under the Act to 
determine whether the Act's procedures meet the requirements of due 
process. 17 
The fundamental concept of pr9cedural due process is that the 
-:':'. 
government may not be permdtted to strip citizens of "life. liberty or 
property" in an unfair, arbitrary manner. Where such important 
individual interests are exposed to possible governmental taking or 
deprivation. the Constitution requires that the government follow 
17The government suggests that if legislation establishing a 
property right also limits the protections of that right, the right may 
be abolished pursuant to the statutory provisions even if those 
provisions fall short of providing normal constitutional due process 
procedures. Govt. Brief at 10. This contention is rejected for two 
reasons. First, although the position had been articulated by Justice 
Rehnquist in a plurality opinion joined by two other justices in Arnette 
v. Kennedy, supra, a majority of the United States Supreme Court had 
never accepted that analysis as of the time of the M[cronesian 
Constitutional Convention. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law. 
supra at 533-36. Beyond that, acceptance of the government's position 
would obliterate constitutional protection against arbitrary abolition 
of important rights established by statute. Legislatures are free to 
decide not to establish important property interests but once those 
interests are established, the Constitution protects against their 
unfair or arbitrary termination or manipulation by government 
administrators • - 887' 
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procedures calculated to assure a fair and rational decision making 
process. 
1. The procedures followed. The procedures followed in Mr. 
Suldan's case up through the ad hoc commdttee proceeding indisputably 
meet these requirements. He was apprised of the charges against h~ and 
given an opportunity to respond. Before his termination he received 
letters from his supervisor outlining the charges and seeking his 
response. After the termination a full evidentiary hearing was provided 
before the ad hoc committee. Mr. Suldan was represented by counsel 
throughout the two day hearing and a record of the proceedings was 
maintained. A written opinion was provided by the ad hoc Committee. 
These procedures are all specified in the Act. 52 FSM Code §§ 151-156. 
Up to that point there is ncr objection to the procedures followed. 
~' .. 
Under the National Public Service System Act however, the written 
statement of the ad hoc committee is not a final decision but merely has 
the status of a "reconmendation." The Act calls for another step: 
[The Committee] shall forthwith transmit that 
statement, with such supporting documentation as it 
deems appropriate, to the highest management 
official responsible for the agency in which the 
appellant is or was employed. The decision of that 
management official shall be final. 
52 FSM Code § 156. 
It is these two sentences against which Mr. Suldan mounts his 
constitutional attack. He argues that these sentences permit decisions 
without reference to the hearing record and effectively undo the 
procedural protections established in the other provisions. 
In this case, the entire record compiled by the ad hoc committee, 
including the transcript of proceedings, actually was transmitted to 
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President Nakayama and he made a "complete and careful review" of the 
record. These recitations in the file are uncontested but Mr. Su1dan 
asserts that the statute is unconstitutional because it does not require 
the highest management official to review the record and base his 
decision upon it. 
In considering this claim, it is helpful to note that President 
Nakayama's departure from the committee's recommendation was on a 
question of law. President Nakayama agreed with the ad hoc committee 
that ~. Suldan's actions and omissions on the days in question 
constituted grounds for termination. He also recognized that the 
government had granted sick leave and annual leave to Mr. Su1dan for his 
absences on those dates. 
The President however did not agree as to the legal effect of these 
facts. Specifically, he did not consider the granting of sick leave or 
annual leave on days when an employee failed without good reason to 
appear for work, to serve as a bar preventing the government from 
disciplining the employee for his failure to appear. 
The Act limits the scope of review to be undertaken by the Court of 
disciplinaryactions.18 We are not to review factual findings such as 
those by the Committee and the President that Mr. Suldan failed to 
appear on the days in question and that the government nevertheless 
awarded him sick leave and annual leave for those days. 
We may however review the decisions of those administrative 
18"Disciplinary actions ..• shall in no case be subject to review in 
the Courts ••• except on the grounds of violation of law or reRulation or 
of denial of due process or of equal protection of the laws. 52 FSM 
Code § 157. -90-
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officials as to the legal effect of those facts. Here, I have reviewed 
President Nakayama's legal conclusion that the granting of sick leave 
and annual leave did not constitute a waiver of the government's right 
to discipline Mr. Suldan for his absences on those days.19 I concur 
with and uphold that legal decision. The government's right to 
discipline an employee for unexcused absences is not erased by the fact 
that annual leave and sick leave are awarded for the days of absence. 
2. The Act's procedural requirements. Leaving aside the question 
of bias of the decision maker the preceding analysis establishes that 
the procedures applied to Mr. Suldan met the requirements of due 
process. This does not entirely dispose of his claims in this case. An 
unconstitutional statute may not be redeemed by voluntary administrative 
action. Mr. Suldan asserts that tqe Act, the vehicle for the 
~~. 
government's actions in this case~ is unconstitutional and that the 
government's attempt to use the unconstitutional Act against him is 
invalid. We must therefore consider whether the last sentences of 
§ 156 are to be interpreted as Mr. Suldan contends. 
Although this opinion declares the obligation of this Court to 
provide judicial review of congressional action to assure compliance 
with the Constitution, the power of judicial review is not to be lightly 
invoked. Unnecessary constitutional adjudication is to be avoided. 
In re Otokichy, 1 FSM Intrm. 183, 190 (App. 1982). If construction of a 
statute by which a serious doubt of constitutionality may be avoided is 
19 In light of Mr. Suldan's admission that his actions furnished 
sufficient grounds for termination, Defendant's Request for Admission 
No.3 (Appendix A to Defendant's Brief on Summary Judgment), there is no 
occasion here for Court review of that question. 
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fairly possible, a court should adopt that construction. Suldan v. FSM, 
FSM Intrm. 201, 205 (Pon. 1982); Truk v. Hartman, 1 FSM Intrm. 174, 180-
81 (Truk 1982); Tosie v. Tosie, 1 FSM Intrm. 149, 157 (Kos. 1982). These 
principles mandate that we begin analysis of the Act with a sympathetic 
effort to understand what Congress was trying to accomplish in enacting 
this language and a presumption that Congress was attempting to enact a 
statute which would meet the basic requirements of procedural due 
process. 20 No legislative history explaining the intended meaning of the 
Act's disciplinary provisions has been located so we must emphasize the 
Act's procedural provisions to discern the pattern. 
Most of the disciplinary action provisions relate to the appoint-
ment and duties of the ad hoc committee, and the hearing over which they 
are to preside. 21 At the conclusion of the hearing, the committee is 
f-.... 
conmanded to prepare a "full written statement of its findings of fact 
and its recomnendations for action." 52 FSM Code § 156. 
Section 156 does not affirmatively state that the final decision of 
20The United States Supreme Court in considering procedural due 
process claims under that Constitution has said: "Due respect for the 
coordinate branches of government, as well as a reluctance when 
conscious of fallibility to speak with our utmost finality [citations 
omitted] counsel against unnecessary constitutional adjudication. • • • 
In particular, this Court has been willing to assume a congressional 
solicitude for fair procedure, absent explicit statutory language to the 
contrary." Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 u.S. 682, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2553, 61 
L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). 
2111At the hearing, the appellant and the responsible management 
official shall each have the right to be heard, to present evidence, to 
be confronted by all adverse witnesses, and to be represented by counsel 
of his own choosing .... [E]vidence shall be taken stenographically or by 
recording machine. The committee shall ... subpoena witnesses and 
tangible evidence, when such witnesses or evidence are relevant and 
material .••• Hearings shall be public except when the appellant 
requests a closed hearing." 52 FSM Code Section 155. 
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the highest management official must be based on the evidence presented 
at the hearing. The Act merely says that the committee shall transmit 
its statement, '\nth such supporting documentation as it deems 
appropriate," to the highest management official. Although the highest 
management official must make the final decision, Congress did not spell 
out the requisite depth of that official's involvement in the process. 
This combination of detailed and elaborate procedures for the ad 
hoc committee and no explicit guidance for the management official 
suggests primary congressional reliance on the committee with an 
expectation that the highest management official's role would normally 
be peripheral. The provision for a final decision by the official 
apparently is in the nature of a safeguard, against decisions either 
patently unfair to an employee-or ~eriously at odds with agency or 
f.': 
branch policy. The plain implication of the statutory scheme is that 
Congress expects that the highest management official would normally 
accept the committee's reccmnendation without extended consideraticn. 
Nothing in the Act suggests that in providing this flexibility and 
opportunity for supervisory participation by the highest management 
official, Congress intended to undercut the procedural safeguards 
erected in the Act's preceding sections. 
I conclude that although the last sentences of § 156 provide a 
range of possible options for the highest management official. he may 
not exercise those options in a way' which undoes the very purpose of the 
hearing provisions. ~ichever path is selected, the official remains 
subject to the Act's overriding requirements of procedural fairness. 
His action must be consistent with the Act's overall procedural scheme. 
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The crucial requirement then is that the final decision be based 
upon the information presented at the hearing and no other information. 
The hearing is the heart of the statutory scheme. To permit a final 
decision without considering the information provided at the hearing or 
based on other information would render the hearing, as well as the 
§ 155 rights to counsel, to be heard and to confront adverse witnesses, 
meaningless. A few examples may illustrate the possible roles available 
to the highest management official and the consequently varying 
responsibilities. 
a. Acceptance of the committee's recommendation. The apparent 
Congressional assumption was that the highest management official would 
normally find the ad hoc committee's recommendation reasonably fair to 
the employee and substantially i~ accord with the policy and needs of 
the branch or agency. Congress~apparently expected that the official 
would normally iS,sue formal approval of the ad hoc conmittee's 
recommendation without full review of the record. That final decision 
would merely give legal force to a decision reached in compliance with 
statutory and due process requirements. The official's decision would 
meet the statutory requirements. 
b. Rejection of the decision. The more difficult questions will 
arise where th~ highest management official is not content with the 
decision of the ad hoc conmittee. There the due process and implied 
statutory requirements could vary, depending on whether the disagreement 
is on issues of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 
If the highest management official declines to accept a finding of 
fact of the ad hoc conmittee, the official will be required by statutory 
as well as constitutional requirements to review those portions of the 
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record bearing on the factual issues and to submit a reasoned statement 
demonstrating why the ad hoc committee's factual conclusion should be 
rejected. 
In this case, President Nakayama accepted the ad hoc committee's 
factual findings that Mr. Suldan had received sick leave and annual 
leave credit on the dates of absences complained of. He differed with 
the comrndttee only as to the legal effect of those facts. Some legal 
issues may be entirely "clean," unaffected by any factual dispute. In 
any event, President Nakayama reviewed the entire record. His actions 
could not be said to have detracted from the purpose of the § 155 
hearing procedures. 
Summarizing then, I conclude that the Act's disciplinary sections 
allow the highest management official to finalize the decision of the ad 
f.~. 
hoc committee without review of the hearing record, if he accepts their 
findings of fact and law, or merely overrules a legal decision 
unaffected by any difference in the facts. To overrule the committee's 
factual findings or rulings on mdxed issues of fact and law, the 
official is required to review all pertinent parts of the hearing record 
and to explain his analysis in his final decision. 
Thus read, the provisions in the last two sentences of § 156 
contemplating final decisions by the highest management official without 
demanding ~ull review of the record flow logically from, rather than 
undercut, the extensive hearing procedures carefully set forth in 
§§ 151 to 156. 
C. Impartiality 
Suldan also argues that § 156 is constitutionally defective because 
it fails to specify that the hearing officer must be impartial. As 
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already indicated, Courts should not lightly assume improper motivation 
of the Congress. Without express language so indicating, I perceive no 
basis for believing that the same Congress which painstakingly set forth 
fair hearing procedures in the Act also intended to authorize final 
decisions by biased decision makers. 22 I conclude therefore that the 
Act, by ~lication, requires decisions by unbiased persons. 
Mr. Su1dan also generically attacks the regulatory identification 
of the § 155 "highest management official" as the head of the 
governmental branch in which the appellant is employed. FSM Pub. Sere 
Reg. 18.14. Mr. Suldan points out that heads of branches will typically 
be supervisors of the executive official whose decision will be at stake 
in the appeals. He contends these persons invariably will be tempted to 
side with their official. 
Unquestionably, due process demands impartiality on the part of 
adjudicators. Ward v. City of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 
L.Ed.2d 267 (1972). This requirement of impartiality surely applies to 
the "highest management official" acting under § 156. Analysis begins 
however with the presumption that the judicial or quasi-judicial 
official is unbiased. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S.188, 102 S.Ct. 
1665, 72 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). The burden is placed on the party asserting 
unconstitutionality. The presumption of neutrality can be rebutted by a 
22See Arnette v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 199, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1666 
40, L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) [White, J. concurring: '~e need not hold that the 
Act is unconstitutional for its lack of provision for an impartial 
hearing examiner. Congress is silent on the matter. We would rather 
assume, because of the constitutional problems in not so providing, 
that: if faced with the question (at least on the facts of this case) 
Congress would have so provided.] 
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showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason for 
disqualification. Where disqualification occurs, it is usually because 
the.adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome or has been the 
target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him. 
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 u.s. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 
(1975). These common grounds for disqualification do not exist here. I 
find unpersuasive Mr. Suldan's generalized conclusions derived from 
forces assertedly influencing branch heads; True, the highest 
management official sometimes could be tempted to support decisions of 
subordinate officials, regardless of the merits. Yet, the highest 
official's incentive to assure fairness and rationality of actions 
within the branch is surely of equal strength. The highest official's 
strongest motivations would se~ to~be to assure that effective 
j.':, 
employees are retained within the ·branch and are not mistreated. I 
conclude that generally the highest management officials will have 
powerful incentives to assure fair personnel actions. These officials 
cannot be said to be biased as a class and they cannot be disqualified 
by virtue of their positions" without individual consideration. 
The only evidence pointed to by Mr. Suldan as showing actual bias 
was a letter, dated January 7, 1983, from President Nakayama to Quirino 
Mendiola, head of the ad hoc committee. Explaining that he had decided 
to disapprove the committee's recommendation, President Nakayama said: 
The management as you know is the legal arm of my 
office which advises me on legal matters including 
the Suldan case. Since there is a conflict of 
interest on the pal:'t of management in advising me on 
this particular case, I have decided to disapprove 
your recommendation (not on the merit but) so that 
the case may be appealed to the FSM Court. , 
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\-Jhile this statement acknowledges a "conflict of interest" on the 
part of the President's legal advisors, there is no indication that the 
President himself was biased. To the contrary, the letter demonstrates 
laudable solicitude and concern for fair play and the rights of Mr. 
Suldan. The letter does not constitute an adequate basis for 
disqualification on grounds of bias. 
I conclude that the Act prohibits biased decision makers and that 
President Nakayama was not biased against Mr. Suldan. 
Conclusion 
The disciplinary action provisions of the National Public Service 
System Act provide procedural protections sufficient to meet 
constitutional due process requirements. Having found that Mr. Suldan 
-
was afforded procedures meeting.~e requirements of due process and of 
f-. 
the Act, the Court denies this appeal from the order te~inating his 
goverrnnent employment. 
The clerk is instructed to enter an order of dismissal and final 
judgment in this case. 
So ordered as of the 28th day of October 1983. 
~c/? 
C ie Justice 
Supreme Court of the Fede ated 
States of M[cronesia 
Entered this __ day of October 1983. 
Chief Clerk of Court 
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